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Summary
Are FDA premarket trials on new drugs and medical devices excessive and do they inhibit consumer access to
new and much-needed technologies? Or may they actually be insufficient and expose consumers to too much
risk? To address this question, the new research described here compares the regulatory approaches of the
U.S. and the European Union for second and third generation coronary stents. The research supports the
FDA’s argument that reductions in their standards for device approval would reduce consumer welfare.
Nevertheless, the research also suggests that in some circumstances, FDA reform proposals advocating for
more relaxed premarket requirements but enhanced post-market surveillance would yield considerable
welfare gains.
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The FDA and the Regulation  
of Medical Device Innovation:  
A Problem of Information,  
Risk, and Access
Matthew Grennan, PhD, and Robert Town, PhD
Innovative new drugs and medical devices are often available in other countries 
long before they arrive (or don’t) in the U.S., creating potentially frustrating 
access problems for U.S. citizens who would like to utilize these products but 
cannot due to the FDA’s approval process, which demands not only product 
safety but effectiveness.
For this reason, among others, excitement in Washing-
ton, D.C. mounted in the summer of 2015, as represen-
tatives from across the political spectrum put forward 
the 21st Century Cures Act. The Cures Act was a 
major piece of rare bipartisan legislation that passed the 
House of Representatives in July but has since stalled 
in Congress. Touted as a law that would accelerate the 
“discovery, development, and delivery of life saving and 
life improving therapies,” the Cures Act offers policies 
to improve research collaboration and access to fund-
ing, updates to the premarket clinical trials process, and 
incentives to enhance personalized medicine and the 
faster discovery of cures, especially for uncommon but 
deadly diseases.1 
The Cures Act—as well as other recently proposed 
legislation2 and regular editorials in reputable news pub-
lications—focus attention on the often debated tradeoff 
between consumer risk and access in the pharmaceutical 
and medical device sectors. An assumption shared by 
these proposals is that the current FDA approval pro-
cess is somehow flawed. In this Issue Brief, we help to 
answer the question: Are FDA premarket trials actually 
SUMMARY
• This issue brief takes up the question of whether the current 
FDA approval process is somehow flawed. Specifically, are FDA 
premarket trials excessive and do they inhibit consumer access 
to new and much-needed technologies? Or may they actually 
be insufficient and expose consumers to too much risk?
• To address this question, the new research described here 
compares the regulatory approaches of the U.S. and the Eu-
ropean Union for second and third generation coronary stents.
•  The research supports the FDA’s argument that reductions in 
their standards for device approval would reduce consumer 
welfare.
•  Nevertheless, the research also suggests that in some circum-
stances, FDA reform proposals advocating for more relaxed 
premarket requirements but enhanced post-market surveillance 
would yield considerable welfare gains. But the gains from any 
such policy change would critically depend on the rate and cost 
of learning via post-market surveillance.
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excessive (i.e., limit consumer access to 
an undue extent) or might they even 
be insufficient (i.e., expose consumers 
to unnecessary risk)? We also examine 
some of the questions imbedded in 
these reform proposals: Should differ-
ent standards be applied to different 
disease areas? What is the potential 
for “post-market surveillance” to sub-
stitute for “pre-market” clinical trial 
requirements?
We studied the market for a 
widely utilized medical device, 
coronary stents, and created a model 
that captures the regulator’s tradeoff 
between consumer risk exposure and 
access to innovative products.3 Our 
research sheds some much needed 
light on the consumer welfare implica-
tions of current FDA regulations and 
takes a useful step toward clearing up 
some of the confusion prevalent in the 
debate over the risk-access tradeoff.
MEDICAL DEVICE 
REGULATION IN THE U.S. 
AND THE EU
The term “medical device” applies 
to a broad set of product categories, 
ranging from crutches to pacemak-
ers to CT scanners. Regulation of 
medical devices in the U.S. began with 
the passage of the Medical Device 
Amendments Act of 1976, prior to 
which there was little oversight of 
the sector. This law placed oversight 
authority within the Food and Drug 
Administration and mandated that 
the FDA use the dual standards of 
“safe and effective” when evaluating 
devices. The Act established a three-
tiered classification system for devices 
(I, II and III), which are assigned 
based on the perceived risks associ-
ated with using a product. Class III 
devices are defined as those used for 
supporting or sustaining human life 
or are critical for preventing poten-
tially unreasonable risk of illness or 
injury. Class I and Class II devices 
are lower risk devices. Our research 
concentrates on coronary stents used 
in angioplasties, which are themselves 
a blockbuster device in terms of sales 
and health impact. Stents are also 
typical of implantable devices that are 
deemed “necessary for the sustainment 
of life” and thus they are regulated as 
Class III devices in the U.S. and EU. 
There are two basic regulatory 
pathways within the FDA to bring 
a device to market: Pre-Market 
Approval (PMA) and the 510(k). 
The PMA process applies to Class 
III devices, while the 510(k) process 
generally applies to Class II and some 
Class I devices. Under the 510(k) 
process the manufacturer needs to 
demonstrate that the device is ‘sub-
stantially equivalent’ to a predicate 
device. Generally, bench testing data 
and perhaps a very small clinical study 
is all that is necessary for a device to 
demonstrate equivalency. While there 
is no standard timetable for 510(k) 
clearance, a straightforward clear-
ance can typically be obtained within 
several months. Approval of a PMA 
device, on the other hand, generally 
requires the manufacturer to pro-
vide data from a pivotal study. These 
are large, multi-center, randomized 
clinical trials. These studies involve 
hundreds to thousands of patients and 
cost tens of millions of dollars to com-
plete. In 2012, only 37 PMAs were 
approved by the FDA.
In the EU the device approval 
process for Class III devices is very 
different from that in the U.S. Medi-
cal devices are regulated by three EU 
Directives; chief among them is the 
Medical Devices Directive which 
passed in June 1993 and has been 
adopted by each EU member state.4 
A medical device is approved for 
marketing in the EU once it receives 
a ‘CE mark’ of conformity. The CE 
mark system relies heavily on third 
parties known as ‘notified bodies’ to 
implement regulatory control over 
 1  House Energy & Commerce Committee, http://energycom-
merce.house.gov/press-release/21st-century-cures-act.
 2  Senators Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Mike Lee (R-UT) have a 
proposal, entitled the RESULTs Act of 2015, that would even 
more dramatically overhaul the system.
 3  The main source for this Issue Brief is our paper “Regulating 
Innovation with Uncertain Quality: Information, Risk, and Ac-
cess in Medical Devices,” 2015.
 4  The Medical Device Directive was passed at a time when 
there was keen interest in a new approach to harmoniz-
ing regulatory frameworks across EU member states. In 
contrast, the U.S. medical device regulatory framework was 
established after the Dalkon Shield injured several thousand 
women, garnering significant public outcry. At that time, a 
non-governmental approach to device regulation was never 
seriously considered by Congress.
 5  In both the U.S. and EU, new-to-the-world devices may face 
the additional hurdle of gaining reimbursement from health-
care insurance companies, but the devices we studied are 
second and third generation products, so coverage determi-
nation has already been made prior to their introduction.
 6  Boston Consulting Group, 2012, “Regulation and Access to 
Innovative Medical Technologies.”
 7  BCC Research, 2015, “Stents: Technologies and Global 
Markets.”
 8  The data used in this study consists of quantities and prices 
at the product-hospital-month level, collected by Millennium 
Research Group’s (MRG) MarketTrack survey of hospitals 
across the U.S. and EU from 2004-2013. This survey—cov-
ering approximately 10 percent of total market activity—is 
NOTES
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devices. Notified bodies are inde-
pendent, commercial organizations 
that are designated, monitored and 
audited by the relevant member states 
via ‘competent authorities.’ Currently, 
there are more than 70 active noti-
fied bodies within the EU. A firm 
is free to choose any notified body 
designated to cover the particular type 
of device under review. To obtain a 
CE mark, a Class III medical device 
needs only to demonstrate safety and 
performance, not necessarily effective-
ness. Compliance with this standard 
usually can be demonstrated with 
much simpler and cheaper clinical 
trials than required by the FDA.5 For 
this reason, medical device manu-
facturers (many of which are U.S. 
based) typically introduce products 
in the EU well before they seek FDA 
approval, if they decide to enter the 
U.S. at all. Conditional on entry into 
both the U.S. and the EU markets, 
private reports have documented that 
medical devices are introduced into 
the U.S. on average approximately 
four years after the EU (Figure 1).6
CREATING AND EMPIRICALLY 
ESTIMATING THE RISK-
ACCESS TRADEOFF MODEL
The standards that a regulatory body 
like the FDA uses to approve prod-
ucts, as well as the information they 
require from manufacturers, have 
the potential to fundamentally alter 
market outcomes. In order to deter-
mine the optimal regulatory testing 
requirements for the FDA, we needed 
to investigate a product with sufficient 
utilization under multiple regulatory 
regimes and one that also has experi-
enced constant innovations over time. 
Coronary stents—particularly second 
and third generation stents—met this 
need. Notably, EU and U.S. regulatory 
approaches diverge most widely with 
respect to Class III devices, including 
stents, creating the variation we lever-
age in our research. The market for 
coronary stents, which treat ischemic 
heart disease (the leading cause of 
global death accounting for 7 million 
fatalities in 2010), is very large and 
the market data for these products  
is excellent. In 2013, total, world- 
wide sales of coronary stents exceeded 
$7.9 billion, with the vast majority of 
those sales occurring in the U.S. and 
the EU.7 
 
the main source of detailed market intelligence in the medi-
cal device sector.
 9  It is important to note that our model applies best to markets 
like stents where interventional cardiologists are highly edu-
cated on new technologies. For innovations more broadly 
used by generalists, there could still be substantial value 
in the pre-market approval process, even with high-quality 
post-market surveillance.
 10  In 2009, over 640,000 stent procedures were performed in 
the U.S. (Auerbach, 2012).
 11  The amount of economic activity regulated by the FDA 
and the Notified Bodies is significant. In the U.S., sales in 
the medical device market exceeded $150B in 2010, or 6 
percent of total national health expenditures, and approxi-
mately $130B (7.5 percent) in the EU (Donahoe and King, 
2012; Medtech Europe, 2013). Further, the introduction of 
new medical technologies are responsible for significant 
reductions in mortality; and in so far as different regulatory 
regimes affect the availability of these technologies, their 
welfare impact extends beyond their direct impact on com-
merce.
 12  Wall Street Journal,  2015, “FDA Inspectors Call Theranos 
Blood Vial ‘Uncleared Medical Device’,” available at http://
www.wsj.com/articles/fda-inspectors-call-theranos-blood-
vial-uncleared-medical-device-1445967607. Note that 
blood tests are an area where excellent real-world data 
on efficacy could often be generated by requiring small 
amounts of redundant comparison tests.
NOTES 
FIGURE 1: TIMELINE OF EU/US TESTING AND MARKET INTRODUCTION. ALL 
DEVICES ENTER THE EU AFTER SAFETY TRIALS. SOME DEVICES 
THAT WISH TO ENTER THE US THEN RUN LONGER, LARGER EFFICACY 
TRIALS (CONCURRENT WITH BEING USED IN THE EU MARKET).
Stents in EU Market
US Testing
(-12 mo) In US Market
EU Testing
(-6 mo)
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We acquired monthly data on prod-
uct-level prices, quantities, and diag-
nostic procedures in the U.S. and EU. 
These data were collected at the hos-
pital level, which we then aggregated 
to the geographic area. The data come 
from Millennium Research Group, a 
medical device market research firm.8 
We then developed a model for cap-
turing the regulator’s tradeoff between 
consumer risk exposure and access to 
innovation, the key feature of which is 
that when a new innovation is discov-
ered, its true quality is uncertain, and 
the rate of learning about an innova-
tion’s true quality in premarket clinical 
trials can be greater than the rate of 
learning after market entry. 
Our data analysis documents 
multiple patterns consistent with 
the predictions of the model. The 
predicted greater access in the EU is 
evident in the fact that, on average, 
49 percent of the stents used in the 
EU are unavailable in the U.S. at the 
points in time we studied. Meanwhile, 
the predicted greater risk in the EU is 
suggested by the facts that, on average, 
products in the EU experience less 
usage overall and higher volatility in 
usage patterns when first introduced. 
The U.S., by contrast, exhibits no 
such patterns. The estimated model 
also suggests that without any clinical 
trials, the stent market could virtually 
fail with very few patients selecting a 
stent due to the risk of receiving a low 
quality device. 
WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF 
REGULATORY POLICY
So how much testing is enough? In 
our estimated model, we find that cur-
rent FDA premarket testing for stents 
falls within our confidence interval 
(seven to nineteen months) for the 
optimal regulatory policy conditional 
on the rate of observational learning. 
This result supports the FDA argu-
ment that reductions in their stan-
dards for device approval will reduce 
consumer welfare. The EU, however, 
despite being able to free-ride off of 
the information being generated in 
trials for U.S. entry, stands to benefit 
by up to 20 percent in welfare gains 
from increasing its premarket testing 
standards (at least for stents).
Some FDA reform proposals 
advocate for more relaxed premarket 
requirements but enhanced post-mar-
ket surveillance. In regards to medical 
devices, the Cures Act would require 
the FDA to establish a program 
for priority review of breakthrough 
products based on case studies instead 
of clinical trials and it would provide 
several regulatory process improve-
ments, including a third party quality 
assessment system through which the 
FDA would accredit third parties to 
assess device quality, safety and effec-
tiveness. For the most part, the Cures 
Act is addressing the correct issues, 
especially with regard to devices with 
small markets.
In the context of our model, we 
find that if post-approval learning 
rates approach those we observe from 
clinical trials at a comparable cost, the 
benefits from such a policy change 
are substantial. In the extreme case 
where post-approval learning is fully 
informative and not too costly, the 
optimal policy is to require no pre-
approval trials at all, which would 
yield a welfare increase of 24 percent.9 
The value of this increase is very large. 
Using baseline estimates of utilization 
and a value of $5,000 per treatment 
yields an estimate of nearly one billion 
dollars per year in increased welfare 
from this increase in post-market 
learning in the U.S. for stents alone.10 
Our analysis of the impact of different 
regulatory regimes not only speaks, 
therefore, to the broad questions of 
the economics of product quality 
regulation, but also clearly informs 
policy given these potentially large 
welfare consequences.11
There is merit, then, to the argu-
ment that requiring shorter trials 
with enhanced post-approval testing 
could improve consumer welfare, but 
the gains from this policy critically 
depend on the rate and cost of learn-
ing via post-market surveillance. For 
some products, observational learning 
from real world use may make it dif-
ficult to infer product quality (i.e., not 
having the randomization built into 
treatment and the control available 
in clinical trials). For other products, 
though—and likely for those in our 
sample—the problem is simply a lack 
of systematic data collection and shar-
ing of information.
An important caveat of our 
analysis is that it holds the technol-
ogy fixed and abstracts away from the 
feedback effects of the FDA’s regula-
tory approval regime on firms’ incen-
tives to invest in new products. In 
other words, the analysis here cannot 
be assumed to hold for future genera-
tions of stents. However, an important 
takeaway from our analysis is that 
the value of a technological innova-
tion to the marketplace depends to a 
large extent on the regulatory regime’s 
informational requirements for prod-
uct testing. For example, coronary 
stents treat a narrower set of condi-
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tions than cancer drugs; but scaled 
for market size, our findings suggest 
that the role of regulating informa-
tion/testing can be comparable to the 
role of new technology innovation 
in affecting welfare. Thus a broader 
takeaway from our research is that the 
innovation process should be consid-
ered holistically from idea to con-
sumer—the value of innovation can  
be significantly enhanced or dimin-
ished by the information regulators 
require technology firms to produce 
and disseminate.
Going forward, we plan to study 
private incentives, or what market 
forces are at play that would cause 
medical device manufacturers to run 
their own clinical trials and pro-
vide this information to the market 
on their own, and not through the 
requirements of the FDA. We also 
want to explore asymmetric informa-
tion, or what happens when a popula-
tion less informed than, say, cardi-
ologists must make decisions about 
which medical products to use. A 
longer term agenda would be to better 
understand how these regulations on 
the pathway from innovation to mar-
ket approval affect the number and 
type of innovations discovered in the 
longer run. Such research would help 
to expound upon our current findings 
and have implications for everything 
from coronary stents to Theranos  
lab tests.12
CONCLUSION
The efficacy requirements of FDA-
required clinical trials provide valu-
able information to the marketplace. 
In some cases, better “post-market” 
surveillance can decrease the need for 
“pre-market” clinical testing, allowing 
access to more innovative new prod-
ucts while still protecting consumers 
from risk. The tradeoff between access 
and risk in regulating the market 
entry of new products is important in 
a variety of industries. Our empirical 
analysis is limited to coronary stents 
between 2004-2013, and repeating it 
is only feasible in the set of devices for 
which detailed market data is avail-
able. While our theoretical model 
provides guidance on how to consider 
extrapolating to policy in other cases, 
doing so should be done with care.
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